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1 Introduction
One of the key criticisms of the ‘aid-growth’ literature is that it fails to recognize
explicitly that aid is given primarily to governments in aid-recipient countries, and
hence any impact of aid on the macroeconomy will depend on government behaviour, in
particular how fiscal decisions on taxation and expenditure are effected by the presence
of aid. This is exactly what motivates the so-called ‘fiscal response’ literature i.e.
modelling how the impact of aid is mediated by public sector behaviour.1 Needless to
say, due to widespread concern about the fungibility of aid in the donor community, the
descriptive analysis of fiscal response, i.e. the fiscal behaviour of the aid-recipient
country is an important task of its own. However, the analysis of fiscal response is also
important because it helps to open one of the many black boxes of the ‘aid-growth’
nexus. The World Bank report Assessing Aid (1998) fails to address the above important
issue by not considering the ‘broader context’ of fiscal response (McGillivray and
Morrissey 2000, Beynon 2002 and Mavrotas 2002).
Long ago it was argued (Griffin 1970) that aid, inter alia, may have a negative effect on
recipient economies since recipient-country governments often use aid money to
increase government consumption rather than directing aid flows towards
developmental government investment. This argument was taken further by Boone
(1996) who by using a rather problematic cross-section analysis for a group of 96
countries, within the context of a Cass-Ramsey-Koopmans type model, concluded that
most of the aid is consumed.2 These potential negative effects of foreign aid could be
viewed further within the context of the fungibility literature; the impact of aid on fiscal
variables in the recipient economy and the related issue of aid fungibility have been the
subject of a booming empirical literature in recent years. The ‘fiscal response’ literature,
however, is not conclusive as far as the overall impact of aid on the fiscal sector of
recipient countries is concerned. A careful review of the relevant literature seems to
suggest that most of the studies following Heller’s seminal paper (Heller 1975) are
problematic on the grounds that they try to maximize a loss function, which cannot be
optimized when the target values of the choice variables are achieved; this basically
means that the targets cannot be truly considered as targets. Studies such as these by
Gang and Khan (1991), Khan and Hoshino (1992) as well as Otim (1996) suffer from
the above shortcoming. Following Heller’s work, these studies try to maximize the
recipient government’s utility function subject to budget constraints, derive structural
equations and subsequently estimate them simultaneously. Binh and McGillivray (1993)
and White (1994) criticize the above approach mainly on the grounds of its faulty
specification of the recipient government’s utility function.3
A major problem with the existing empirical studies on aid effectiveness (including
World Bank’s Assessing Aid) and the fiscal response literature is their neglect of the
                                                
1 The term is attributed to White (1992).
2 Boone concluded that the marginal propensity to consume from permanent transfers is one; the
marginal propensity to invest from transfers is zero; and the above marginal propensities do not vary
with income per capita.
3 See next section for a detailed discussion.2
heterogeneous character of foreign aid. One of the main features of the vast quantitative
literature of the effectiveness of development aid in recipient countries has hitherto been
the employment of a single figure for aid.4 However, this is likely to provide misleading
conclusions on aid effectiveness, since we can distinguish at least four different
categories of aid:
•   project aid with a rather lengthy gestation period,
•   programme aid which disburses rapidly as free foreign exchange,
•   technical assistance, and
•   food aid and other commodity aid which adds directly to consumption.
To the above four types of foreign aid, emergency or relief aid could be added as a
separate category, given its increasing importance in recent years (Cassen 1994,
Addison 2000).
There are three relevant points here: firstly, different types of aid operate in different
ways (and with different lag-structure) in the recipient country thus resulting in different
macro effects; secondly, because of different conditions relating to each in different
countries (e.g. the state of aid co-ordination may vary among aid recipients), there is
also an extra reason to expect different effects of aid in each country – the ceteris
paribus assumptions of the econometrics of aid may be disturbed by such
considerations; and thirdly, perhaps most importantly, within an endogenous fiscal
response framework5 if the government attaches a different utility to each category of
aid, using a single figure of aid would lead to aggregation bias in the results and
conclusions reached.
The neglect of the aid disaggregation issue in the voluminous aid effectiveness literature
was the main motivation of the model developed by Mavrotas (2002). The author
provides strong empirical evidence, using time series data for Kenya and India, which
clearly suggests the importance of aid disaggregation so that meaningful conclusions on
the impact of aid on the fiscal sector can be derived.
In this paper we develop a fiscal response model which extends the model developed by
Mavrotas (2002) on a number of grounds: firstly, a new variable, food aid, is included in
the model, apart from project aid, programme aid and technical assistance; secondly, all
four aid variables used in the model are endogenized following Franco-Rodriguez et al.
(1998); thirdly, also following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) we specify the budget
                                                
4 A notable exception to the general neglect of the disaggregation of aid is a study by Levy (1987)
(although in the context of a different aid-disaggregation, that is between ‘anticipated’ and
‘unanticipated’ aid), which gives a strong indication that if we consider the macroeconomic impact of
aid in a disaggregated framework, the standard conclusions of the existing studies could be altered
dramatically. In Levy’s study, the reported estimates, from the estimation of a consumption function
for 39 countries over the period 1970-80, indicate different tendencies of anticipated (mainly project
aid) and unanticipated aid (food aid, relief aid etc.): unanticipated aid is fully consumed but more than
40 per cent of anticipated assistance is invested, thus contributing significantly to the growth process
in recipient countries (Levy 1987).
5 This means that aid is endogenized in the government utility function.3
constraints in a way to avoid over-restriction and full fungibility. Fourthly, we derive, in
addition to the structural equations, the reduced form equations, which allow us to
evaluate the total impact of the different components of aid on the public sector of the
recipient.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the settings of the
elements of the model. Section 3 is concerned with the derivation of the model solution.
To support further the argument for aid disaggregation we develop, in Section 4, a
model where aid is aggregated and then we derive both structural and reduced form
equations so that the two results (disaggregation versus aggregation) are comparable.
The last section concludes the paper.
2 Modelling the impact of disaggregated aid on the fiscal sector
The model assumes that the recipient government aims at maximizing a utility function
that can be represented as:
1234 (,,,, , , , ) g Uf I G T B A A A A =           [1]
where Ig is public investment capital expenditure, T represents tax and non-tax revenue,
B is government borrowing from all sources, G is government recurrent expenditure, A1
is project aid from all donors, A2 represents programme aid from all sources, A3 stands
for technical assistance and A4 is food aid from all donors.
It is assumed that the government is a rational utility-maximizer setting annual targets
for each fiscal variables and tries to reach these targets. Following Mosley et al. (1987),
Binh and McGillivray (1993) and more recently Mavrotas (2002) this behaviour can be
represented by a utility function without the linear terms, as below:
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where the starred variables represent the exogenous target variables, 0 i α   for i =
1,…,8. The  ' i s α  represent the relative weights given to different terms in the utility
function and, without loss of generality, may be normalized so that they sum up to
unity. If the government meets all its targets, the maximum unconstrained would be  0 α .
A distinctive feature of the above model is that it endogenizes the four main
components of foreign aid (project aid, programme aid, technical assistance and food
aid). Aid variables are endogenized following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) who
                                                
6 It is clear from this equation that the government utility is maximized when all targets are met, with
the maximum being  0 α .4
rightly argued that aid disbursement is influenced by the recipient and, therefore, should
be considered as a government policy variable.
We then assume, following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) that the government
maximizes utility function [2] subject to the following budget constraints:
1234 g I GBTAA AA +=+++ ++              [3]
12 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6 GT A A A A B ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ≤ +++++              [4]
where  01 i ρ ≤≤  and i = 1,2,…,6. The assumption underlying the budget constraint
represented by Equation [3] is that government total spending (investment +
consumption) must equal the sum of borrowing, tax and non-tax revenues and the
different types of foreign aid. In other words, the government is assumed to run a
balanced-budget. The rationale for the second constraint (Equation [4]) is that external
forces (donors or domestic interest groups) will determine the way the government
allocates it resources i.e. the ρs in Equation [4] will be imposed on the government or
those setting the targets and allocating revenue. Consequently, there will be no
guarantee that the targets are met even if total revenue equals total expenditure (Franco-
Rodriguez et al. 1998).
Contrary to many previous studies in the fiscal response literature, we also include
borrowing in the specification of the second budget constraint. Some previous studies
have assumed that the government prefers not to borrow for consumption purposes, as it
is costly in relative terms. However, such restriction, in our view, should be the outcome
of the estimation results i.e. if the government does not borrow to finance consumption
then the coefficient of B in equation [4] would not be significantly different from zero
(i.e.  6 0 ρ = ).
3 Deriving the model solution
In this section, the model solution is derived. This involves deriving both structural and
reduced form equations. For this purpose, the Lagrangean is applied to the
maximization problem, as below:
123 *2 *2 *2
0




11 2 3 4
2 1 21 32 43 54 6
()()()
222



















=− − − − − −
−−−−−−
−− − −
++ − − − − − −
+− −−−−−
               [5]
where  1 λ  and  2 λ  are the Lagrange multipliers.5
Turning the inequality sign into an equality and taking the first derivatives with respect
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Like Heller (1975), Mosley et al. (1987) Gang and Khan (1991) and others we assume
ex ante that the target for borrowing (B*) is equal to zero. Solving the first order
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However, the above structural equations only capture the partial effects of the aid
variables to the extent that they ignore the indirect feedbacks, operating through the
simultaneous system formed by Equations [16] to [23]. To capture the total impacts
(direct and indirect), which are crucial for policy purposes, it is important to derive the
reduced form equations. Simultaneously solving the preceding structural equations and
expressing each endogenous variable in terms of the exogenously determined variables
the reduced form equation can be obtained as follows:
** * * * * *
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7 Given the large number of parameters involved we only report the parameters of interest i.e. those
related to the aid coefficients. Further, these parameters are not needed in the estimation stage.  Full
details are available by the authors upon request.9
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From the estimation of each i δ  above we could deduce the total impact of aid of each
type of aid on the other endogenous variables. This requires that we first estimate the
structural equations and then insert these estimates into the reduced-form equations.
In view of the centrality of the aid disaggregation approach in the present paper, it will
be also useful to present the results of the same model, but, this time, with aggregated
aid, so that useful comparisons can be drawn. This is the focus of the next section.10
4 The model with aggregated aid
The model retains the same assumptions as the previous one; the only difference being
that now it is assumed that aid is aggregated rather than disaggregated. It is, therefore,
assumed that the government maximizes the following utility function:
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Similarly, this utility function is maximized subject to the following two constraints:
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Turning the inequality in [33] into an equality sign, applying the Lagrangean to the
maximization problem and partially differentiating it with respect to each endogenous
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The system of structural equations [42] to [46] can then be solved through to obtain the
reduced form equations as follows:
** **
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8 It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that some of the parameters reported here are different to those
reported in Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998). However, recent work by McGillivray and Ahmed (1999),
Franco-Rodriguez (2000) and more recently McGillivray (2002) confirm that the structural equations
[41] to [45] are rightly derived.12
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Building on recent developments in fiscal response modelling (Franco-Rodriguez et al.
(1998)) as well as on recent work by Mavrotas (2002) which focused on the important,
though neglected in the aid effectiveness literature, aid disaggregation issue, the present
paper develops a new fiscal response model, which, for the first time in the relevant
literature, endogenizes the main four components of foreign aid.
We endogenized aid variables on the grounds that the disbursement of each category of
aid is a government policy choice. With regard to aid disaggregation, there is an
argument that each of the four main categories of aid, namely project aid (A1),
programme aid (A2), technical assistance (A3) and food aid (A4) may exert different
effects on the recipient economy. Furthermore, and more importantly, in case the
preferences of the recipient government are higher for some of these types of aid, not
disaggregating aid might lead to aggregation bias in the results and conclusions and
hence lead to misleading policy recommendations.
                                                
9 As in the previous case of the model with disaggregated aid we only report the parameters related to
the coefficients of aid.13
Specifying the budget constraints as in Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), the model is
then solved to obtain both the structural equations (capturing the direct impacts on the
endogenous variables) and the reduced form equations (which capture the total
impacts).
A second model in which aid is included in aggregated form is also presented and both
the structural and reduced form equations were derived. This will allow the
disaggregated model to be tested in the empirical stage and ensure that the bias
associated to most aid effectiveness studies is highlighted. Moreover, presenting both
models could help other researchers interested in future empirical work to compare
results of aggregated aid and disaggregated aid models so that significant policy
implications can be derived.
References
Addison, T. 2000. ‘Aid and Conflict’, in F. Tarp (ed.) Foreign Aid and Development:
Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. Routledge Studies in Development
Economics 17.
Beynon, J. 2002. ‘Policy Implications for Aid Allocations of Recent Research on Aid
Effectiveness and Selectivity’, in B. Mak Arvin (ed.) 2002, New Perspectives on
Foreign Aid and Economic Development. Praeger: Wesport, Connecticut.
Binh, T. N. and M. McGillivray. 1993. ‘Foreign Aid, Taxes and Public Investment: A
Comment’. Journal of Development Economics 41: 173–176.
Boone, Peter. 1996. ‘Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid’. European
Economic Review 12:29–58.
Cassen, R. 1994. Does Aid Work? Oxford University Press: Oxford (2nd edition).
Franco-Rodriguez, S. 2000. ‘Recent Developments in Fiscal Response Models with an
Application to Costa Rica’. Journal of International Development 12 (3): 429–442.
Franco-Rodriguez, S., M. McGillivray and O. Morrissey. 1998. ‘Aid and the Public
Sector in Pakistan: Evidence with Endogenous Aid’. World Development 26: 1241–
1250.
Gang, I. and H. A. Khan. 1991. ‘Foreign Aid, Taxes and Public Investment’. Journal of
Development Economics 34 (1): 355–69.
Griffin, K. 1970. ‘Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economics Development’.
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics 32 (2): 99–
112.
Heller, P. S. 1975. ‘A Model of Public Fiscal Behaviour in Developing Countries; Aid,
Investment and Taxation’. American Economic Review 65 (3 June): 429–45.
Khan, H. A. and E. Hoshino. 1992. ‘Impact of Foreign Aid on Fiscal Behaviour of LDC
Governments’. World Development 20: 1481–1488.
Levy, V. 1987. ‘Anticipated Development Assistance, Temporary Relief Aid, and
Consumption Behaviour of Low-Income Countries’. Economic Journal 97 (June):
446–458.14
Mavrotas, G. 2002. ‘Foreign Aid and Fiscal Response: Does Aid Disaggregation
Matter’? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (Review of World Economics) 138 (3): 534–
559.
McGillivray, M. 2002. ‘Aid, Economic Reform and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour in
Developing Countries’. University of Nottingham. Centre for Research in Economic
Development and International Trade. Credit Research Papers, 02/11.
McGillivray, M. and A. Ahmed. 1999. ‘Aid, Adjustment and Public Sector Fiscal
Behaviour in Developing Countries’. Journal of Asia-Pacific Economy 4: 381–91.
McGillivray, M. and O. Morrissey. 2000. ‘Aid Fungibility in Assessing Aid: Red
Herring or True Concern’? Journal of International Development 12: 413–428.
Mosley, P., J. Hudson and S. Horrell. 1987. ‘Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in
Less Developed Countries’. Economic Journal 97 (387): 616–41.
Otim, S. 1996. ‘Foreign Aid and Government Fiscal Behaviour in Low-Income South
Asian Countries’. Applied Economics 28.
White, H. 1992. ‘The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey’.
Journal of Development Studies 28: 163–240.
White, H. 1994. ‘Foreign Aid, Taxes and Public Investment: a Further Comment’.
Journal of Development Economics 45: 155–163.
World Bank. 1998. Assessing Aid: What works, what doesn't, and why. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press.